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CREW DECISION MAKING UNDER STRESSS. _. NASA-Ames Research Center,
Moffett Field, CA 94035
INTRODUCTION. Flight crews must make decisions and take action when
systems fail or emergencies arise during flight. These situations may involve high
levels of risk, information uncertainty, and time pressure, factors that contribute to
stress. Full-mission flight simulation studies have shown that crews differ in how
effectively they cope in these circumstances, judged by operational errors and crew
coordination. The present study analyzed the problem solving and decision making
strategies used by crews led by captains fitting three different personality profiles.
Our goal was to identify more and less effective strategies that could serve as the basis
for crew selection or training..{_'_T..H_.Q.I_. Twelve 3-member B-727 crews flew a
5-leg full-mission simulated flight over 1 1/2 days. Two legs included 4 abnormal
events that,required decisions during high workload perio+ds. Transcripts of
videotape,_?were analyzed to describe decision making strategies. Crew performance
(errors and.codrdination) was judged on-line and from videotapes by check airmen.
RESULTS. Based on a median split of crew performance errors, analyses to date
indicate a difference in general strategy between crews who make more or less
errors. Higher performing crews showed greater situational awareness--they
responded quickly to cues and interpreted them appropriately. They requested more
decision-relevant information and took into account more constraints. Lower
performing crews showed poorer situational awareness, planning, constraint
sensitivity, an d coordination. The major difference between higher and lower
performing crews was that poorer crews made quick decisions and then collected
information to confirm their decision. CONCLUSION. Differences in overall crew
performance were associated with differences in situational awareness, information
management, and decision strategy. Captain personality profiles were associated with
these differences, a finding with implications for crew selection and training.
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COGNITIONAND PROCEDURE REPRESENTATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
PREDICITIVE HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODELS
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, Ca. USA
Models and modeling environments for haman performance are becoming significant
contributes to early system design and analysis procedures. Issues of levels of automation,
physical eilvironement, informational environment, and manning requirements are being
addressed by such man/machine analysis systems. The research reported here investigates the
close intemtion between models of human cogntiion and models that describe procedral
performance. We describe a methodology for the decomposition of aircmw procedures that:
supports interaction with models of cognition on the basis of procedures observed; that serves to
identify cockpit/avionics information sources and crew information requirements; and that
provides the structure to support methods for function allocation among crew and aiding systems.
Oar approach is to develop an object-oriented, modular, executable software representation of the
aircrew, the aircraft, and the procedures necessary to satisfy flight-phase goals. We then encode,
in a frame-based language, taxonomies of the conceptual, relational, and procedural constraints
among the cockpit avionics and control systems,and the alrcrew. We have designed implemented
a goals/procedures hierarchic representation sufficient to describe procedural flow in the cockpit.
We then execute the procedural representation in simulation software and calculate the values of
the flight instruments, aircraft state variables and crew resources using the constraints available
from the relationship taxonomies. The system provides a flexible, extensible, manipulable and
executable representation of aircrew and procedures that is generally applicable to crew/procedure
task-analysis. The representation supports developed methods of intent inference, and is
exteusible to include issues of information requirements and functional allocation. We a_e
attempting to link the procedural representation to models of cognitive function to establish
several intent inference methods including procedural backtracking with concurrent search,
temporal reasoning, and constraint checking for partial ordering of procedures. Finally the
representation is being linked to models of human decision making processes that include
heuristic, propositional and pr¢'_criptive judgement models that are sensitive to the procedural
context in which the valuativc tu,ctions are being performed.
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BEYOND THE COCKPIT: THE VISUAL WORLD AS A FLIGHT INSTRUMENT. W+W.
Johnson. M.K. Kaiser. and D.C. Fovle. NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett
Field, CA 94035-1000.
The use of cockpil ;,,: t+uments to guide flight control is not always an option
(e.g., low-level rolorcraft flight). Under such circumstances the pilot must
use out-the-window information for control and navigation. Thus it is
important to determine the basis of visually guided flight for several
masons: 1) to guide the design and construction of the visual displays used in
training simulators; 2) to allow modeling of visibility restrictions brought
about by weather, cockpit constraints, or distortions introduced by sensor
systems; and 3) to aid in the development of displays that augment the
cockpit window scene and are compatible with the pilot's visual extraction of
information from the visual scene. The authors are actively pursuing these
questions. We have ongoing studies using both low-cost, lower fidelity flight
simulators, and state-of-the-art helicopter simulation research facilities.
Research results will be presented on: 1) the important visual scene
information used in altitude and speed control; 2) lhe utility of monocular,
stereo, and hyperstereo cues for the control of flight; 3) perceptual effects
due to the differences between normal unaided daylight vision, and that made
available by various night vision devices (e.g. light-intensifying goggles and
infra-/red sensor displays); and 4) the utility of advanced contact displays
in which instrument information is made part of the visual scene, as on a
"scene-linked" head-up display (e.g., displaying altimeter information on a
virtual billboard located on the ground).
USING AND DESIGNING PROCEDURES; LESSONS LEARNED FROM AVIATION.
_. San Jose State University Foundation, San Jose, CA 95106.
E. L. Wiener. University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124
Procedures drive almost every task and sub-task on the flight deck of a
commercial airliner. Failure to conform to Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) is frequently listed as the cause of violations, incidents, and accidents.
Moreover, according to a study of 93 commercial aviation accidents, the leading
crew-caused factor in aviation accidents was "pilot deviation from basic
operational procedures" (Lautman and Gallimore, 1988). However, in most
cases procedures and checklists are designed piecemeal, rather than based on a
broad philosophy and on policies for operations. A framework of philosophy,
policies, procedures and their relationship to the actual practices on the
flight-deck is suggested. Initial results of an ongoing field-study to investigate
the usefulness of these concepts will be reported.
Lautman, L. G., & GALLIMORE, P.L. (1988). Control of the crew-caused
accidents. Seattle: Boeing Commercial Airplane Company.
AIRCREW REACTIONS TO COCKPIT AUTOMATION, _. University of
Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124
The modern, highly automated taransport cockpit has brought a new era of
highly efficient flight. But it has also introduced new problems of situational
awareness, remoteness from.the basic airplane, and concerns about possible
loss of manual flying proficiency. This paper will discuss the "good new/bad
news" of cockpit automation.
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MILITARY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS, CURRENT SAFETY ISSUES. R. A. Levy*
(Air Force Safety Agency) and D. T. Fitzpatrick* (Army Safety
Center) Co-chairman.
This panel will consist of five presentations on human factor
(operator) issues in military aircraft accidents, focusing on
immediate and future concerns. The U.S. Army will discuss the
underlying causes of aircraft accidents during Desert Shield/Storm
as compared to the non-combat environment. The U.S. Navy will
review the trends and causes of Naval aviation accidents and the
effect on current training. The U.S. Air Force will present the
problem of human factors in the logistical arena. The Canadian
Forces will discuss their proposed system to collect and analyze
human error data from aircraft accidents. The Royal Air Force will
describe recent studies concerning emergency egress equipment.
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